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OCKET NO. VCaZOL-CA UTAH C0URT 0 F APPEALS 
GEORGE S. PERKINS and LILLIE PERKINS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
DICK COOMBS, an individual, COOMBS 
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
respondent, and JOHN DOE FIDELITY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
DICK COOMBS, COOMBS INVESTMENT CORPORATION, 
and JOHN DOE FIDELITY COMPANY, 
Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CENTURY 21 MONSON & COMPANY, PETER ROBERT 
LUCERO, and JESSE MONSON, 
Third Party Defendants. 
INTERLAKE THRIFT, a Utah Corporation, 
Cross-Claimant, 
vs. 
DICK E. COOMBS, 
Cross-Defendant. 
INTERLAKE THRIFT, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GUARANTY TITLE COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
SOUTHERN TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, INC., 
aka FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, INC.; MARK J. WILLIAMS, an 
individual; and RUTH R. COOMBS, an individual 
Third-Party Defendants. 
APPELLANTS' 
PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Case No. 860306-CA 
SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
ERIC E. HARTMAN, 1400 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
2120 South 1300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 8 
486-3751 
, Suite 
4106 
301 
Thomas T. Billings 
John W. Andrews 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Grant Thornton 
Company, Receiver of 
Interlake Thrift 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
532-3333 
LIST OF PARTIES 
George S. and Lillie Perkins - plaintiffs and appellants on 
appeal. 
Interlake Thrift - defendant and respondent on appeal. 
Dick E. Coombs - defendant, actions by or against whom were 
stayed by bankruptcy filing; not a party on appeal. 
Coombs Investment Corporation - defendant, actions by and 
against which were stayed by bankruptcy filing, not in 
business, not a party on appeal. 
Century 21—Monson and Company - Third-party defendant, claim 
against whom stayed by Coombs bankruptcies; not a party on 
appeal. 
Peter Robert Lucero - Third-pary defendant, claim against whom 
stayed by Coombs bankruptcies; not a party on appeal. 
Jesse Monson - Third-party defendant, claim against whom stayed 
by Coombs bankruptcies; not a party on appeal. 
Guarantee Title Company - Third-party defendant, not in 
business; not a party on appeal. 
Mark J. Williams - Third-party defendant, dismissed out by 
trial court; not a party on appeal. 
Southern Title Guaranty Company, Inc. - Third-party defendant* 
Did not appeal judgment against it in favor of Interlake 
Thrift. 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, Inc. - Third-party 
defendant; not a party on appeal. 
Ruth R. Coombs - Third-party defendant, actions against whom 
were stayed by bankruptcy filing; not a party on appeal. 
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APPELLANTS' 
PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Case No. 860306-CA 
Plaintiffs and appellants herein, George and Lillie Perkins, 
through their counsel, Samuel King and Eric P. Hartman, petition 
the Court of Appeals (panel: Judges Davidson, Garff and Jackson) 
for a rehearing to determine the relative priority between 
Interlake and the Perkins on the Jeremy Street property after 
Perkins' initial sale of the property in October, 1980. 
Perkins are delighted with the Opinion of the court and seek 
no change in its terms. They do seek ruling on an additional 
point. 
Perkins' problem is that while they have won, they may have 
no remedy. 
Interlake is one of the six failed Utah thrifts and is in 
the hands of a receiver, Grant Thornton Company. 
The Opinion entitles Perkins to more adequate attorney fees. 
It entitles them also to punitive damages if such are determined 
appropriate by the evidence at rehearing. Finally, the Appellate 
Opinion gives them priority over Interlake based on the second 
phase of their dealings with Interlake, when in 1981 Interlake 
induced them to sign a subordination agreement by fraud. 
Because Interlake is insolvent and its depositors apparently 
will not be fully paid, and those depositors have priority over 
ordinary creditors, it is in dispute that Perkins will be paid by 
Interlake. 
In fact, it is possible that there will not even be hearings 
at all to determine the fee and punitive damages issues. If it 
is determined there is no source from which to pay the judgment, 
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the hearings would be an exercise in futility. 
In such a situation, so that justice can be done by the 
victimized party receiving economic recovery, Perkins urge the 
Opinion be augmented. 
What the Perkins desire is a ruling from the court in regard 
to the "first phase" of the transaction, when CIC in 1980 
obtained a loan from Interlake that did not correspond with the 
Perkins' authorization. The issue to be decided is who had 
priority then, the Perkins or Interlake? 
Interlake obtained a policy of title insurance insuring its 
priority over Perkins in this first phase. The title company, 
Southern Title Guaranty Company aka Fidelity National Title 
Insurance Company, that issued the policy of title insurance, was 
brought in as a third party defendant interpleaded by Interlake 
to protect it in the event that it lost the first phase priority 
dispute with plaintiffs. In fact, when the trial court ruled 
that Interlake had priority over Perkins on the first phase, the 
title company paid Interlake's defense fees for that phase. 
Perkins' major tangible recoverable claim is the value of 
their home itself. 
If the Appellate Court will amend its decision by enlarging 
it to include a decision as to priority on the first phase, then 
Perkins will be in a position to recover the home's value from 
the title insurer. Without this, Perkins are unsure as to 
whether they can have the title company pay based on the 
Appellate Opinion that Perkins acquired priority in the second 
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phase, the fraud phase, because the title insurance may not reach 
to acts of fraud on the part of its insured, Interlake. 
Perkins believe that the Court of Appeals in its statement 
of the facts of the case approached making such a ruling 
concerning priority as to phase one but didn't do so, because 
awarding the Perkins priority in the second phase appeared 
adequate. 
Perkins believe that such a determination will also be of 
value to other sellers and lenders seeking guidance in regard to 
real property transactions in Utah. 
The first four paragraphs of the Court's Opinion state most 
of the facts concerning the first phase that are necessary to 
make the desired finding of priority. 
In phase one, Perkins authorized a loan representing the 
down payment they were to receive from CIC and instead CIC took a 
larger loan, larger not only because it was $3,756 higher than 
authorized by the Perkins, but because it bore effective interest 
at 10% greater than the Perkins had authorized. The interest 
itself when applied to the entire amount of the loan, over its 
10-year term, multiplies the differential. 
The trial court recognized this. In its Findings of Fact at 
paragraph 12 it stated: 
"12. The loan actually obtained by CIC from Interlake, 
$20,756.44 at the effective rate of 24%, is not 
'approximately' a loan of $17,000 at 14% interest 
(Authorization of the Earnest Money Agreement)." 
[Emphasis added] (Appellants' Original Brief, 
Addendum 1, Page 5) 
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The trial court's error of law is stated by it in the 
following portion of paragraph 12 of its Findings, that Perkins 
"waived any objection" because they "attended the closing and 
failed to ascertain what was ultimately going to be put on the 
property by way of a trust deed and trust deed note..." 
Based on that erroneous conclusion of law, the trial court 
found Interlake had priority over Perkins for phase one. 
References in this Petition are to the parties' original 
briefs on appeal. 
Appellant's original brief at pages 27-33 quotes the 
appropriate law. Pages 33-44 distinguish this case from the lead 
case of Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 24 Utah2d 288, 470 
P.2d 390 (1970) . 
This law is that when a commercial lender loans a buyer down 
payment money to buy land, it is the duty of such a lender to 
determine whether its loan complies with the authorization given 
by the seller. Otherwise, it would be reducing the seller's 
security by intruding without his authorization into his equity. 
The seller has expressed his intent in the Earnest Money, that 
document is available to the lender, and it is the lender's duty 
to comply with it or seek the seller's consent to a modification. 
No law to the contrary was submitted to the trial court, and 
its finding that even though Perkins should have had priority, 
they waived it by failing to make inquiry, is not supported by 
law, and is contrary to good business practice. It is also 
particularly inappropriate to the striking facts of this case. 
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In addition to the facts stated in the Appellate Opinion 
concerning phase one, other persuasive, undisputed facts, also 
support the basic legal position that Perkins should have 
priority over Interlake. (See Appellants' Brief, pages 3-16 for 
recitation of facts in detail). 
These include the facts that Interlake knew that Perkins had 
given CIC an Earnest Money Agreement, yet Interlake made no 
effort to discover or comply with its terms. Rather Interlake 
gave a letter of instructions (Appellants' Brief, Addendum V) to 
the title company to advance the money to CIC only when the 
closing had been so managed that CIC's loan from Interlake had 
priority ahead of CIC's obligation to the Perkins, so that the 
title policy would show Interlake had first priority. 
Interlake withheld from the closing officer the actual terms 
of its loan to CIC. 
It was for this reason that, as stated in the Appellate 
Opinion, "...the closing officer did not advise them (Perkins) of 
the deviation from the Earnest Money Agreement in both the 
principle amount and the interest rate." 
That is, the closing officer did not advise the Perkins of 
the deviation because he did not know. This also means that had 
the Perkins made inquiry, the closing officer could not have 
advised them of the deviation. 
The title insurer, and its agent the title company that 
handled the closing for it, may have erred by insuring title 
without learning Interlake's loan terms. These are business 
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entities whose business is insuring and closing real estate 
transactions. Having insured the title on the apparent 
assumption that the Interlake loan was proper, the title insurer 
should now be liable to pay over to the Perkins the loss its 
insured, Interlake, should pay. 
On their part, Perkins reasonably relied on the 
professionalism of the title company and the title insurer at the 
closing that the Interlake loan was proper. 
Appellants believe that this conduct of Interlake at the 
first phase was as unconscionable as its fraud in the second 
phase. The result was to keep everyone in the dark, except CIC 
which remained silent because it was getting more money than 
Perkins had authorized. It was also for this reason that CIC's 
young salesman, Paul Scott, stated that later, when Perkins' suit 
was filed, he was "shocked" to find that the CIC loan did not 
comport with the Perkins' authorization (Appellants' Brief, page 
15). He attended the closing, and was himself kept in the dark 
by Interlake and by Mr. Coombs, the owner of CIC, as to the 
excessive Interlake loan. 
Appellants have a substantial time problem, Mr. Perkins now 
being over 80. 
Accordingly, Perkins do not object to the Appellate Opinion. 
They simply ask that it be augmented. 
The phase one facts are stated in detail in Appellants' 
original brief at pages 3-16. 
Perkins concede that, under ordinary circumstances, the 
6 
Court's resolution of priority in the property after subsequent 
transactions in 1981 would render the question of priority as of 
October, 1980 moot. However, because of the unusual circumstance 
of Interlake Thrift's insolvency and liquidation, Perkins believe 
that either they and/or Interlake's receivers, Grant Thornton 
Company, may have as their only recourse a claim against the 
title insurance policy issued in October, 1980, to Interlake, as 
the insured, by Southern Title Guaranty Company. 
DATED December 1, 19 88. 
/ ' / / / 
SAMUEL KING 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on December 1, 1988, I mailed four copies of 
the foregoing to each of the following persons: 
Thomas T. Billings 
John W. Andrews 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Grant Thornton Company, 
Receiver of Interlake Thrift 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Brant H. Wall 
Attorney for Southern Title Company 
800 Boston Bldg. 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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